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Gasping respiration in the dying patient is the last respiratory pattern prior to terminal apnoea. The
duration of the gasping respiration phase varies; it may be as brief as one or two breaths to a
prolonged period of gasping lasting minutes or even hours. Gasping respiration is very abnormal, easy
to recognise and distinguish from other respiratory patterns and, in the dying patient who has elected
to not be resuscitated, will always result in terminal apnoea.
Gasping respiration is also referred to as agonal respiration and the name is appropriate because the
gasping breaths appear uncomfortable and raise concern that the patient is suffering and in agony.
Enough uncertainty exists about the influence of gasping respiration on patient wellbeing, that it is
appropriate to assume that the gasping breaths are burdensome to patients. Therefore, gasping respi-
ration at the end of life should be treated.
We propose that there is an ethical basis, in rare circumstances, for the use of neuromuscular blockade
to suppress prolonged episodes of agonal respiration in the well-sedated patient in order to allow a
peaceful and comfortable death.
A14-year-old female with neuromuscular disease was hos-pitalised with acute respiratory insufficiency whichcomplicated an episode of pneumonia. On admission,
she was obtunded, and at her parents’ request, she was intu-
bated and mechanically ventilated. Three weeks after admis-
sion, the teenager was awake, alert, and able to communicate,
but ventilator dependent. Although her parents wanted to
enroll her in a chronic home mechanical ventilation pro-
gramme, the patient repeatedly and consistently expressed a
desire not to be ventilated. Numerous sessions with different
individuals established quite clearly that total dependence on
a machine was unacceptable to the patient. After long debate,
her requests were respected and ventilator support was
removed. She died the same day surrounded by friends and
family. Prior to terminal apnoea, she experienced a period of
gasping respiration that lasted 13 minutes. This respiratory
pattern persisted in spite of increasing doses of morphine. A
meeting was held with her parents several months later. Dur-
ing this meeting the mother stated that she wished she that
she had not had to see her daughter gasping. The mother is
convinced that her daughter suffered and has frequent dreams
where she revisits her daughter’s last agonal breaths.
An 18-year-old with a severe, chronic, progressive, and
untreatable neurological condition had muscle dystonia and
spasms so severe that they interfered with respiration and
required endotracheal intubation. Treatment with intrathecal
baclofen as well as benzodiazepines and narcotics failed to
control muscle spasms and prevented ventilator weaning. The
parents eventually requested withdrawal of mechanical venti-
lation and extubation. Once extubated, aggressive use of
baclofen, benzodiazepines, narcotics, and barbiturates was
continued to control the muscle spasms and respiratory
obstruction with good effect initially but without effect once
his gasping respiratory pattern started. During this gasping
phase, the patient was unresponsive and would have apnoea
for 30–60 seconds, which would then be interrupted by an
agonal breath. This process continued for 40 minutes despite
adjusting the various medication infusions upward. His father
repeatedly asked: “Isn’t there anything else you can give him?
He is suffering.”
Could these scenarios have been avoided? Yes. In these
cases, the administration of a neuromuscular blocking agent
would have stopped the gasping response and would have
allowed these patients to die in peace. But would it be unethi-
cal (and perhaps illegal) to do this? In this paper,we will argue
that there is an ethical basis, in some rare circumstances, for
the use of neuromuscular blocking agents to suppress the
gasping response in order to allow patients to die more peace-
fully and comfortably, when they or their surrogate decision
makers have requested palliative care. The last gasps of agonal
respiration are not necessary and may be avoided. Although
many readers may object that suppression of agonal respira-
tion is equivalent to active euthanasia, we shall argue that it
can be justified much in the same way that one can justify
other medical decisions that may hasten death, such as termi-
nal sedation. While the term, terminal sedation, is being
eschewed because of its ambiguous connotations, the indica-
tion for fulfilling a patient’s expressed wish of being relieved of
the perceived burden of consciousness in the presence of
intractable suffering is ethically acceptable.1 A preferred term,
total sedation, suggests complete relief of suffering.2 The pro-
vision of total sedation as an ethically acceptable intervention
is based on historical imperatives to relieve suffering,
especially in the face of imminent death.2 The goal of admin-
istration of a neuromuscular blocking agent is to alleviate the
patient’s suffering and to provide comfort to the dying patient.
Hastening of the patient’s death is an unintended, though
foreseeable, consequence of suppression of agonal respiration.
END OF LIFE DECISIONS AND PALLIATIVE CARE
Few people would dispute the idea that a dying patient or their
legitimate surrogate decision maker should be able to choose
treatments that minimise pain, discomfort, and suffering
which accompany terminal illnesses and the dying process. A
medical paradigm known as palliative care provides a morally
sound approach to end of life decisions.3 Palliativemedicine, as
opposed to curative medicine, emphasises pain and symptom
management and the alleviation of suffering. This approach
seeks neither to hasten death nor prolong life; the main goal is
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to take steps to alleviate pain, discomfort, and suffering.4 5
When the decision has been made to adopt this paradigm, it is
often appropriate to withdraw or withhold medical interven-
tions that exacerbate or prolong pain and suffering, such as
artificial nutrition and hydration, mechanical support of ven-
tilation, or antibiotic therapy.6 7
Good care of the dying involves administration of medica-
tions such as analgesics, sedatives, and anti-emetics, in order
to minimise the suffering associated with pain, dyspnoea,
delirium, convulsions, and other terminal complications
encountered in the dying patient.8 9 For such patients it is
ethically appropriate gradually to increase the dosage of nar-
cotics and sedatives to relieve pain and other symptoms, even
to dosages that might also shorten the patient’s life.4 10
CAUSING OR HASTENING DEATH
So far much of what we have said is fairly non-controversial,
but controversies begin to arise when one considers whether it
is acceptable to implement treatment plans that cause or
hasten death. What do we mean by “cause or hasten” death?
The difference between causing death and merely hastening it
is a matter of degree. A person who smokes two packs a day of
cigarettes and drinks a fifth of whisky every night is likely to
shorten her life by years, and we might say that the person “is
hastening” her own death. If she stops smoking and drinking,
we would say that she is attempting to “prolong”her life. If, on
the other hand, that same person takes an overdose of alcohol
and sedatives, we would say that the person caused her own
death.
Does it make much of a difference, from a moral point of
view, whether one causes or merely hastens death? Common
sense seems to dictate that there should be some difference
between causing and hastening death: there is a difference
between taking an overdose of drugs and alcohol and having
a lifestyle that may lead to an early demise. The first case takes
away life altogether; the secondmaymerely take away years of
life. There are also, however, many borderline cases where
“hastening death” is not very different from “causing death”.
For example, consider the man who poisons his aging mother
by giving her small doses of poison in her food over a
six-month period until she dies. Is this better than giving her
one massive dose of poison that leads to immediate death? We
think not. Indeed, death by slow poisoning may be worse than
death by quick poisoning because it causes more pain and
suffering. Thus, although people often speak of a difference
between “hastening death” and “causing death” this differ-
ence is, at best, a matter of degree, not a matter of kind.
Many procedures that involve the refusal of treatment, such
as withdrawing a patient from a ventilator or stopping artifi-
cial hydration or nutrition, cause or hasten death. Clinicians
and ethicists have few moral reservations about these
procedures because they merely allow the patient to die
“naturally”. One might describe these cases as “letting die”
but not as “killing”. If a patient with terminal lung cancer dies
after being weaned from a ventilator, many would argue that
the patient’s disease caused his death, not the physician. On
the other hand, if the patient is not on life support but is suf-
fering greatly and the physician assists the patient in dying by
administering a lethal dose of a narcotic or a neuromuscular
blocking agent, then we would say that the physician caused
the patient’s death.11 Most people would describe this kind of
assistance in dying as “euthanasia”. The physician might also
play a key role in causing the patient’s death if the physician
helps the patient to kill himself by providing the patient with
the means necessary to bring about death.Most people would
describe this type of aid in dying as “physician assisted
suicide”. Those who believe that doctors should not kill their
patients object to euthanasia and physician assisted suicide
but may endorse withholding/withdrawing/refusing medical
treatment.12
A person who “hastens” death does play a role in causing
the death but that is not the same thing as saying the person
is the cause of the death. For any death there will be many dif-
ferent causal factors but we assign some more weight than
others for medical, legal, or moral reasons. When we ask:
“What is the cause of death?” we are trying to assign medical,
legal, or moral responsibility for the death. A person who has-
tens death may or may not be medically, legally, or morally
responsible for the death, depending on the circumstances. For
example, if a man is terminally ill with cancer and his wife
poisons him with arsenic over a period of days, she has
hastened his death and is properly the cause of the death. She
could be properly charged with murder. But a person who
withholds food and fluids from a man with terminal cancer
(upon his request) certainly also hastens the man’s death but
that person is not the cause of the death and probably should
not be charged with murder.
INTENDING DEATH
But why do we draw distinctions between “letting die” and
“killing” when it comes to end of life decisions? One plausible
answer is that the physician’s intentions are relevant to our
assessment of their behaviour. Physician assisted suicide,
euthanasia, and refusal of treatment all involve behaviours
that lead to the patient’s death. In physician assisted suicide
and euthanasia, however, death is intended; in refusal of
treatment, it is not. All of these procedures aim to relieve pain
and suffering, but in physician assisted suicide and euthana-
sia, the physicians aim to relieve pain and suffering by causing
(or helping to cause) death; death is a means to alleviating
pain and suffering.13 Now one might object, saying that physi-
cians usually have unclear or ambiguous intentions in end of
life care.14 One might argue that many times physicians who
withdraw life support intend that their patients die, want
them to die, or may foresee them dying.
We agree that it is often quite difficult to understand all of
the different intentions, goals, plans, and desires that are
involved in end of life decisions and actions. But onemay want
or foresee something that one does not intend; intending
implies much more than foreseeing or wanting.15 I may want
to learn how to play the piano, but my want is nothing more
than a mere want until I devise a plan for achieving my goal,
and begin to carry it out. Moreover, if I fail to achieve the goal
or to carry out some of the plans necessary to achieve the goal,
I may regret this failure and devise some other way of achiev-
ing my goal. I may foresee that I will get wet if I ride my bicy-
cle home when a storm is approaching, but my foreseeing this
event does not imply that I intend it to happen. I may intend
to ride my bicycle home but an unintended result of this
action is that I get wet. If we apply these considerations to
intending to bring about the death of a patient, we can say
that intending the death of the patient implies the following:
PLANNING AND DELIBERATION
The physician develops and implements a plan for bringing
about the death of the patient. For example, if a physician
carefully determined the dosage of morphine necessary to
cause death, deliberated about her actions, and administered
that dose and the patient died, we would say that the
physician intended to bring about the patient’s death; the
physician killed the patient.16
REGRET AND REMEDY
If, for some reason, the patient does not die, the physician has
some regret and takes some steps to remedy the situation. If
the physician allows the patient to breathe normally after
withdrawal of support, then he is not intending to bring about
the patient’s death. If the physician is disappointed that the
patient does not die after withdrawal of life support and he
The agony of agonal respiration: is the last gasp necessary? 165
www.jmedethics.com
takes additional steps to bring about death, such as smother-
ing the patient, then he has clearly intended death. In physi-
cian assisted suicide and euthanasia, physicians have some
regret if the procedure fails and may take some steps to rem-
edy the situation if it does. For example, a physician may
increase the dose of a lethal medication if the initial dose fails
to bring about the patient’s death. This kind of action is more
appropriately described as “killing” because death is more
clearly intended.
Thus, although it is often very difficult to understand human
actions and intentions, especially in matters of life and death,
we believe that some consideration of intentions is required in
order to determine the moral status of end of life decisions.
“Killing” implies an intention to cause or hasten death;
“letting die” implies no such intention. In both cases, the phy-
sician may want or foresee the death of the patient, but there
are crucial differences between wanting, foreseeing, and
intending.
TERMINAL SEDATION AND DOUBLE-EFFECT
DEATHS
The waters become a bit murkier when one considers active
medical interventions, such as administering opioids or seda-
tives, which are designed to relieve pain and suffering but may
have the foreseeable effect of hastening death. Many
advocates for better end of life care argue that “terminal”
sedation may be an appropriate way of alleviating pain and
suffering in terminally ill patients with intractable pain or
extreme physical distress.17–21 Under a typical protocol, the
physician carefully titrates sedatives and analgesics to the
level necessary to achieve comfort and pain and symptom
control. Very often patients who are terminally sedated
become unconscious and never regain consciousness.
Is terminal sedation a type of euthanasia? According to our
analysis, terminal sedation is a type of euthanasia only if the
physicians intend to cause or hasten death. How could we tell
if a physician intended to bring about death through terminal
sedation? This is not an easy question to answer, and many
would argue that intentions can be very slippery in these
cases.22 23 If we follow our earlier analysis, then terminal seda-
tion would be called intentional killing only when: 1)
physicians plan for the death of their patients and take steps,
such as increasing dosages of sedatives and opioids, in the
absence of signs or symptoms of suffering, in order to bring
about death; 2) physicians have some regret when the patient
is not dying soon enough and they take steps, such as increas-
ing dosages, in order to bring about the patient’s death. If the
physician is careful and provides only enough medication to
make the patient comfortable and alleviate the patient’s pain
and suffering, then we would say that this type of terminal
sedation is not euthanasia or killing.19
Does terminal sedation hasten death? Although the
evidence suggests that terminal sedation does not always has-
ten death—many patients linger far longer than anyone
expects—terminal sedation does hasten death in many
cases.18 Thus, the hastening of death is a foreseeable
consequence (or risk) of terminal sedation. If we assume that
death is a type of harm, then how can it be morally acceptable
to perform an action that one knows may produce a harmful
effect? To deal with this question in end of life decisions,many
writers have appealed to the rule of double effect.24 This moral
rule has wide application, but has played a particularly impor-
tant role in the care of the dying, allowing those who are mor-
ally opposed to euthanasia and assisted suicide to provide
adequate pain relief without violating traditional medical
morality or their consciences.
Although variously formulated, the role of double effect
specifies that an action with two possible effects, one good
(intended) and one bad (harmful), is morally permitted pro-
vided that:
1. The goal of the action (or intended effect) is itself good.
2. The intended effect is not achieved by means of the harm-
ful effect.
3. The harmful effect is not intended, only permitted.
4. There is no other way of producing the good (intended)
effect.
5. There is a proportionately good reason for allowing the
harmful effect.
Terminal sedation can meet all of these conditions, since the
goal of terminal sedation is to relieve pain and suffering,
which is itself a good goal; the relief of pain and suffering is
not achieved by bringing about death (unlike euthanasia or
physician assisted suicide); the harmful effect (death) is not
intended; there is no other way to relieve pain and suffering
other than increasing doses of opioids and sedatives; and
relieving intractable pain and suffering in a terminally ill
patient is a proportionally good reason for hastening the death
of the patient.25 26 Although the principle of double effect may
free physicians from moral culpability, it does not completely
liberate them from legal responsibility. A prosecutor could still
attempt to charge a physician with homicide or criminal neg-
ligence when death occurs. However, since there is a solid legal
basis for palliative care, which aims to relieve suffering,
assessing the physician’s intention would still play a key role
in any legal action resulting from a double-effect death.18 27
One of the key criticisms of the principle of double effect is
that it relies on some understanding of the distinction
between intended and unintended effects, since it applies only
when death is not intended. Cases where physicians intend to
bring about death are best described as “euthanasia” or
“assisted suicide” but not “double-effect” death. As we
stressed earlier, we believe there is a moral basis for
distinguishing between intended and unintended (though
perhaps foreseeable) effects. Indeed, even withdrawal of care
at the end of life would be morally questionable without this
distinction, because death is often a foreseeable and unin-
tended consequence of withdrawal of artificial nutrition,
hydration, or ventilation.
AGONAL RESPIRATION AND SUFFERING
We have now laid the moral framework for a position and are
prepared to show why we think that suppression of agonal
respiration may be permitted in some circumstances. To make
our point, we need briefly to describe the gasping response.
Assessment of breathing patterns can be complicated in
dying patients. Severe dyspnoea, especially at the end of life, is
extremely difficult to control. Dyspnoea is a subjective experi-
ence defined as an uncomfortable awareness of breathing,
breathlessness, or distressing shortness of breath which may
be associated with extensive secretions, cough, chest pain,
fatigue, or air hunger.28 This symptom can cause the patient
and family to be very fearful; dyspnoea conveys the image of
suffering. Numerous pharmacological and non-
pharmacological interventions can be initiated concurrently
to minimise end of life dyspnoea.
Beyond the subjective symptom of dyspnoea exists the res-
piratory pattern characterised by gasping. Gasping is a brain-
stem reflex; it is the last respiratory pattern prior to terminal
apnoea.29 Gasping is also referred to as agonal respiration and
the name is appropriate because the gasping respirations
appear uncomfortable, causing concern that the patient is
dyspnoeic and in agony. There is no question that these agonal
breaths are distressing for both family and medical staff to
observe (see Case discussions). Many parents report that
watching their children gasp at the end of life is among the
worst experiences of their children’s illness.30 Many parents
can graphically describe the horror they felt when their child
appeared to be struggling to breathe at the end of life; they
perceived the child to be distressed.31
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Gasping, or autoresuscitation, is a well-studied physiologic
alevent.32 In response to asphyxia, there is an initial period of
arousal and hyperpnoea, then primary apnoea lasting seconds
or minutes, then a gasping stage. The gasps become
progressively weaker and finally result in terminal apnoea
unless external support is provided. Gasping respirations are
easily recognised as the presence of a rapid inspiratory rise
accompanied by a retarded expiratory phase preceded and fol-
lowed by a cessation of breathing movements.33 34 Gasping is a
strong indicator of hypoxaemia. In various animal species
gasping does not occur unless PaO2 has fallen to <5–15mmHg
and is elicited only by hypoxaemia and not by hypercapnia or
acidosis.35 36 Gasping has been identified as a very powerful
autoresuscitative mechanism, one that is unlikely to be influ-
enced by sedatives.37–39 In addition, gasping respirations in the
imminently dying patient will not lead to long term survival
unless external intervention is also provided, however, the
patient, or their surrogate has requested that such external
intervention not be used.
Patients who are gasping have profound hypoxaemia,
which most likely renders them unconscious. Thus, one might
argue that patients who are gasping do not suffer. We agree
that given our current knowledge of pain, suffering, and brain
function, patients who are gasping are probably not experienc-
ing pain or suffering. We cannot be certain, however, that
these patients are not in pain or suffering. It is possible that
these patients still have enough brain function to have some
awareness of the discomfort and pain of the gasping response.
After all, these patients are net yet brain dead; if they were,
there would be no gasping response. These patients have some
level of brain activity and it is at least possible that they can
feel pain and suffer.
Given this lack of certainty,we believe that themorally most
defensible position is to err on the side of relieving possible
pain and suffering instead of erring on the side of not reliev-
ing pain and suffering. There is a great deal we do not know
about human sensation, awareness and, nociception, the nox-
ious sensation of pain as such, without regard to its emotional
significance. For many years, paediatricians, and neonatolo-
gists believed that newborns could not feel any pain and they
frequently conducted surgical procedures, such as circumci-
sion, without anaesthesia.40 In the past scientists took a simi-
lar approach to the pain and suffering of animals, but
contemporary animal care and use regulations require
researchers to do their best to minimise pain, suffering, and
discomfort of animals used in research.41 At one time
physicians did not believe that patients could feel pain during
general anaesthesia, but there are now some well-known
cases of patients who were awake and felt a great deal of pain
during surgery but could not move their bodies or make their
suffering known.42 43 Finally, failure properly to manage
pain—to assess, treat, and manage it—is professional
negligence.44
One way of justifying our approach to clinical uncertainty
regarding pain, discomfort, and suffering is to appeal to a
principle of decision theory known as the maximin rule.
According to this rule, when one is faced with a decision
where the states of the world are uncertain, then one should
choose the option that avoids the worst possible outcome.45 For
example, if your choices are “wear a seatbelt” and “don’t wear
a seatbelt” and the states of the world are “get in a wreck” and
“don’t get in a wreck” you would be advised to wear a seatbelt
because 1) getting in a wreck is uncertain, 2) and the worst
outcome would be getting in a wreck and not wearing a seat-
belt. If we look at pain, and suffering in the gasping patient in
the same way, our choices are “provide adequate relief of pain
and discomfort” or “don’t provide adequate relief of pain and
discomfort”. The states of the world are “the patient can feel
pain or discomfort” or “the patient cannot feel pain or
discomfort”. Clearly, the worst outcome is one where the
patient can feel pain and discomfort but we do not provide
adequate relief of pain, and suffering. Moreover, given the
mounting evidence about knowledge of the pain, discomfort,
and distress related to dyspnoea, we have good reasons to
believe the pain, discomfort, and distress in agonal respiration
would be very great if the patient has some awareness of these
symptoms. Considerable evidence exists which suggests that
in many patients, dyspnoea is related to respiratory muscle
contraction.46 47
THE ETHICAL BASIS FOR STOPPING AGONAL
RESPIRATION
We are now in a position to defend the main thesis of our
paper. Since we believe the physicians should err on the side of
alleviating pain and suffering when faced with clinical uncer-
tainty, and we believe that gasping patients may be in consid-
erable pain and suffering a great deal, stopping the gasping
response can be sanctioned according to the principle of dou-
ble effect. First, the general duty to alleviate pain and suffering
supports a decision to alleviate the pain and suffering associ-
ated with agonal respiration; relieving pain and suffering is a
good goal.48 Second, as mentioned earlier, gasping respirations
may not be influenced by analgesics and sedatives routinely
used in end of life care.When adequate doses of sedatives and
analgesics have been provided and the patient continues to
have agonal, gasping respirations (as in our illustrative cases)
the use of neuromuscular blocking agents, in proper dose,
would terminate the gasping respirations.
In these unfortunate situations, the patient’s medical
condition has resulted in the death process with gasping res-
pirations as the final step; however, gasping respirations
(autoresuscitation) cannot be effective under these circum-
stances. Since these gasps cannot restore or maintain life, they
serve no useful purpose; however, they may cause suffering for
the patient even in the presence of adequate sedation. For
these patients, the options are truly “prolonged gasping then
death” or “minimal gasping then death”. In these cases of
certain death, utilisation of a neuromuscular blocking agent
cannot be seen as precluding the possibility of survival.
Instead it should be seen as shortening the period of suffering.
It must be emphasised that neuromuscular blocking agents
should be considered only after adequate sedation has been
provided and has failed to relieve the gasping respirations. In
addition, neuromuscular blocking agents have no analgesic or
sedative properties and, therefore, should never be used in the
absence of adequate sedation.49
Third, death is not a means of alleviating the patient’s suf-
fering; stopping the gasping is the means. Fourth, given the
potential severe pain and suffering and the inevitability of
death, stopping the gasping response is a proportionately good
reason for allowing the hastening of death. Fifth, and perhaps
most importantly, death is not intended; the intention is to
stop the gasping response. This claim may be a bit controver-
sial: how can one say that a physician who gives a patient a
neuromuscular blocking agent in sufficient quantities to stop
the gasping response does not intend death? Recalling our
earlier discussions of intending death, we would say that the
physicians are not deliberately planning death. Death is not
deliberately planned because the physicians do not make
preparations or plans in anticipation of the gasping response.
Indeed, we believe that physicians probably hope that patients
do not gasp. Terminally ill patients are treated with sedatives
and analgesics in proportion to the degree of dyspnoea but not
with the intention of causing cessation of respirations. Once
gasping respirations have begun, however, there is no
plausible possibility that the patient can survive; cardiac arrest
will occur, usually within minutes. In such a case of certain
death, utilisation of any medication to ensure comfort cannot
be seen as precluding the possibility of survival.
Does a physician who uses muscle relaxants to stop the
gasping response intend death? This question hinges on mak-
ing a distinction between “intending death” and “foreseeing”
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death. Without this distinction, the doctrine of double effect
collapses, since there are many bad consequences that people
may foresee but not intend. Also, even withdrawal of
treatment at the end of life becomes morally problematic with-
out a distinction between “intending death” and “foreseeing
death”.From a legal point of view, a person can be said to intend
an outcome,when they take actions to bring it about and desire
that it occur, or when the outcome is the natural and probable
result of their conduct. The law makes no distinction between
physician X who gives a dying patient an overdose of morphine
in order to stop their suffering, and physician Y who gives an
overdose of morphine in order to win a bet. Both physicians can
be charged with murder because they have the required intent
to kill. But it is important, from a moral point of view, to distin-
guish between physician X and physician Y because foreseeing
an outcome is not the same as intending it. Although the phy-
sician who uses muscle relaxants to stop the gasping response
can foresee that the patient will die as a result, this is not his
intent any more than a dentist who performs dental work
intends that the patient will feel pain. Pain is a natural,
probable, and foreseeable result of dental work but the dentist
does not deliberately inflict pain or take steps to ensure that his
patients feel pain. Indeed, dentists administer analgesics in
order to minimise pain. It makes no more sense to say that a
dentist “intends that his patients feel pain” than it makes sense
to say that “a physician who uses muscle relaxants to stop the
gasping response of a terminal patient intends that the patient
die”. We realise that the boundary between “intent” and “fore-
seeability” can be both murky and contentious, but we also
believe that it is a morally important distinction.
The use of neuromuscular blocking drugs immediately
before ventilator withdrawal has been suggested to prevent
any outward signs of discomfort that might disturb the
patient’s family.50 It is appropriately argued that such an
approach cannot be justified.51 52 If a patient was given a
neuromuscular blocking agent before ventilator withdrawal,
she would not be given a chance to breathe on her own. In this
circumstance, one could say this would be evidence of
planning the patient’s death.
In the cases we are describing, however, accepted palliative
care is provided to relieve some of the symptoms of dyspnoea
but to still allow the patient’s normal breathing pattern to
resume. The decision to administer neuromuscular blocking
agents would be made only after the patient were no longer
breathing normally and had entered the gasping phase.
Finally, it has been argued that the removal of assisted ven-
tilation in the presence of prolonged or irreversible neuro-
muscular blockade may be justified based on the futility or
disproportionate burden of continued treatment, and does not
necessarily imply the clinician’s intent to hasten death.53 We
argue in similar fashion; gasping respirations are absolutely
futile and possibly burdensome to the patient. Whenever, on
the balance of probabilities, they are judged to be a cause of
suffering, gasping respirations at the end of life should be
treated even if as a result the dying process is shortened.
OBJECTIONS
Before closing we would like to consider some certain
objections to our view.
Objection 1: Patients who are gasping are not in pain nor are
they suffering; there is no need to provide any palliative medi-
cations at this point. They are almost dead and are no longer
in any distress.
Reply: We concur that there is strong empirical support for
this position. If science can one day prove that patients who
are gasping have no awareness at all, then we would change
our views about administering paralytic agents. But there is
still a great deal we do not know about human sensation,
awareness, and nociception. Moreover, no patient has ever
survived the gasping phase and told us what it feels like. Thus,
we cannot be certain that gasping patients are not suffering. If
there is a reasonable chance that they are in pain or suffering,
then palliative measures are appropriate.
Objection 2: Allowing physicians to take measures to stop
the gasping response creates a slippery slope toward taking all
sorts of measures in the name of alleviating pain and
suffering. It is only a short step from administering
neuromuscular blocking agents during gasping to more active
forms of euthanasia. To stop this slide, physicians must refrain
from all actions that are dangerously close to euthanasia or
physician assisted suicide.
Reply:We agree that slippery slope concerns are present here
as well as in other end of life decisions. We also agree that end
of life care is ripe for abuse and that physicians must take
steps to prevent abuses. Some slopes are, however, more slip-
pery than others, and some slides are avoidable. The cases we
describe here are unusual cases in end of life care, since most
patients do not enter a prolonged gasping period before dying.
Moreover, prolonged gasping does not occur in patients who
are not gravely ill or capable of being successfully resuscitated.
Thus, there is little chance that someone would use our proto-
col to stop the normal breathing pattern of a patient who was
not terminally ill.
Objection 3: The principle of double effect may be acceptable
in ethics but not in law. A physician who followed your
recommendations could be convicted of 2nd or 3rd degree
murder, since he or she would be causing the patient’s death
and would have the requiredmental state, such as legal intent,
recklessness, or negligence.
Reply: As we noted earlier, the principle of double effect does
not excuse the physician from all legal responsibility.We think
it is highly unlikely, however, that a jury would convict a doc-
tor of murder who followed our recommendations, since the
doctor would not be planning to cause death. Moreover, we
would argue that a law that prohibits good care for the dying
patient is immoral and ought to be revised to allow physicians
to stop the gasping response.
Objection 4: Since the terminally ill patient in the gasping
phase of death is unlikely to be conscious and feeling pain, the
use of neuromuscular blocking agents to stop the gasping is
beneficial only to those watching the patient die.
Reply: Again, one cannot be sure that the patient is not suf-
fering and, therefore, he should be treated. We agree that use
of neuromuscular blocking agents would make the patient
appear more comfortable and peaceful. Indeed, that is the goal
of end of life palliative care. The Institute of Medicine’s defini-
tion of a good death is: “A decent or good death is one that is:
free from avoidable distress and suffering for patients,
families, and caregivers; in general accord with patients’ fami-
lies’ wishes; and reasonably consistent with clinical, cultural,
and ethical standards”.54 When death is inevitable and
compassionate terminal care is required, not only the patient’s
comfort, but also the minimisation of the loved ones’ distress
becomes a priority. Research has shown that families are trau-
matised by a protracted death in which the patient struggles to
breathe.55
We believe that the use of neuromuscular blocking agents in
well-sedated, terminally ill, gasping patients allows fulfilment
of all the requirements of the Institute of Medicine’s definition
of a good death. Although we do not use neuromuscular
blocking agents for this purpose at the current time, we hope
this discussion results in dialogue which allows future appli-
cation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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